We present a divertible zero-knowledge proof (argument) for SAT under the assumption that probabilistic encryption homomorphisms exist. Our protocol uses a simple 'swapping' technique which can be applied to many zero knowledge proofs (arguments). In particular we obtain a divertible zero-knowledge proof for graph isomorphism. The consequences for abuse-free zero-knowledge proofs are also considered.
II. Main results

Notation and Definitions
(A, B, C) is a divertible interactive triple of Turing machin~ [0089) . For the definition of divertible proofs and abuse-free systems see [0089, Des90] ; for the SAT proo~ (argument) see [BCC88, BC89] . A probabilistic encryption function f.(.) satisfies the properties that given s, n, and r, r', b = b' = 1.) The modulus nand s parameterize f. We shall assume that all the probabilistic encryption functions considered in this paper are parameterized, but for simplicity we ignore this in our notation.
We denote by {z} a string which is a concatenation of strings of type z with delimiters. Remarks: We will describe a protocol which ca.n be used for many zero-knowledge proofs with slight modifications. This protocol does not require tha.t the structures involved are commutative. Furthermore it can easily be adapted to make the authentication system [Des88} unconditionally divertible (so that two or more independent wardens can be used).
II.2. Theorems and implications for abuse-free proofs
lThe quotation marks are due to the unnatural condition (iii) of Definition 1 in [0089] , which implies that the protocol is only divertible when graph isomorphism is not decidable in probabilistic polynomial time. In the final paper we will restate this definition but without this property.
III. Main approach
Many interactive zero-knowledge proofs, as, [Blu87,CEvdG88,GMW86,GMR89,BCC88] (and a.rguments [BCC88, BC89] ) have protocols with a loop in which:
Step 1 the prover sends a 'commitment' (blob),
Step 2 the verifier asks a. one bit question,
Step 3 the prover replies to this,
Step 4 the verifier checks the reply.
These steps are repeated t times independently. In this paper we are only interested in such protocols.
To prove the theorems in Section II. we will first adapt such a protocol and show that the resulting protocol is also a zero-knowledge proof (argument). We then apply this procedure to the SAT protocol(s). Finally we transform the adapted SAT protocol(s) and obtain a divertible zero-knowledge proof (argument). This transformation uses a 'swapping'technique.
II!.t. Adapting a zero-knowledge protocol
In this section A is the prover and B the verifier. Consider a general protocol P of the type described above.
Protocol P: input x. B checks that x has the appropriate form. Then the following steps are repeated t times independently:
Step lA sends B: Z E 11.,
Step 2 B sends A: q ER {V, 1},
Step 3 A sends B:
Step 4 B verifies that p(x, Z, q, Y) = 1, where p is an appropriate polynomial time predicate.
(Here 'ER' means 'selected randomly with uniform distribution'). This protocol is adapted as follows:
B checks that x has the appropriate form. Then the following steps are repeated t times independently:
Step 1 A sends B: (Zo, Zd E 11. x 11.,
Step 2 B sends A: q ER to, I},
Step 4 B verifies that p(x, Zo,q, Yo) = 1 and that p(x, Zt,q, Y1) = 1.
We assume that the honest prover chooses the Zo E 1t with the same distribution as the Z in the protocol P, and similarly for Zt. Let us study the relation between the protocols P and P'. Hereto let us consider the query of B in pI as a pair of queries (q, q).
It is then easy to verify that Yo corresponds with an answe~ which would have been given in protocol P when Zo would have been the cover and q the query. A similar observation is valid for Yi, Zl, ij.
Theorem 5 If for appropriate conditions P is a zero-knowledge proof (argument) then for the same conditions pi is also a zero-knowledge proof (argument).
Proof.
The completeness and soundness conditions are obvious. To prove that P'
is zero-knowledge we describe a simulator ME' for any ( To show how the adaptation and swapping technique is used we will first apply it to the graph isomorphism protocol, making it divertible. Then we extend this and obtain a divertible protocol for SAT. A sketch of the proofs is given in the following section.
IV.l. Graph isomorphism An introduction: The [GMW86] protocol
Let r 0 and r t be graphs with vertex set V and (j : r 1 -j . robe an isomorphism (a is a permutation of the vertex set V). In the [GMW86] graph isomorphism protocol the verifier B first checks that the input (r 0, r 1) is a proper description of two graphs. Then, in
Step 1, the prover A chooses a random permutation 1\' " and sends B the graph Z = 1\'"(ro).
In
Step 2, B asks the random bit-question q. In Step 3, A sends the permutation Y = 7ra q •
Step 4, B checks that Z = Y(r q). These steps are repeated t times (t is the length of the input). C checks that:
Zf = Y{(rq).
Observe that when e = 1, B 'swaps' the Z,. and the Y,. to obtain the Z;. and the Y:'
IV.2. SAT An introduction: The [BCC88] protocol for SAT
The [BCC88] protocol is a zero-knowledge proof (argument) for a satisfying assignment of a Boolean circuit. This circuit consists of h logic gates with truth tables T m , 1 ~ m ~ h, and the connecting lines (wires). A satisfying assignment can be regarded as a collection of pointers, one for each truth table, which point to the computation rows of the Tm. In
Step 1 of the [BCC88] protocol, the prover, for each m:
• complements some of the columns of Tm = (biJ)m using bits Cj (one for each line),
• permutes the rows i of T:" = (b;,j EEl Cj)m using a permutation 11" (one for each truth and r" can be computed given r, r', b"'(i)'; $ C;, and cj.
We denote by X = HCi' ri,j, 11")} the strings which contain the complementation bits Cj, the random strings ri,j and the permutations 11". These form a direct product group g.
A divertible protocol for SAT
The protocol is described in Figure 1 . In this protocol 
V. Sketch of proofs
Proof of Theorem 1: In the final paper we shall show that the above protocol satisfies the conditions of Theorem 1. Let p be a predicate as in [BCC88] .
C checks that:
are satisfied.
Observe that Theorem 1 does not imply Theorem 2 since our protocol is only conditionally abuse-free. Indeed suppose that only once during the execution of the protocol A decides to replace one row (e.g. the row (111) by (000)). The probability that B will detect this is only 1/2. If the encryption is insecure then the verifier C will find out that this has happened. Proof of 
VI. Conclusion and remarks
For all so far proposed divertible zero-knowledge proofs, the question that B asks A is the exclusive-or of the question that Casks Band B's random bit. This may give one the impression that A can convince independently two verifiers simultaneously (B and C). However after careful analysis it is clear that when A and C collaborate the soundness related to B is conditional for many proofs of membership.
To illustrate let us consider the graph isomorphism case. Let us assume that dishonest A and dishonest C have infinite computer power and that the graphs ro r l are not isomorphic. A now sends Zo isomorphic to r ° and Zl isomorphic to r 1. C is now able to calculate e (using exponential computer power). Then 6 can manipulate ql'
The same remark is valid for some of the schemes presented earlier [DGB88, 0089] . For some it is sufficient that C knows some trapdoor information to perform above fraud. This problem implies that the [0089] formal definition of divertible zero-knowledge has to be revised in this context. By analyzing Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 we see that even though divertibility and abuse-freeness have common aspects they are essentially different concepts.
